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Abstract
Conventional wisdom holds that institutional changes and trade liberalization are two main
sources of growth in per capita income around the world. However, recent research (e.g., Rigobon
and Rodrik 2004) suggests that the Frankel and Romer (1999) trade and growth ﬁnding is not
robust to the inclusion of institutional quality. In this paper, the authors argue that this “trade and
growth puzzle” can be explained once institutional quality is acknowledged as a determinant of
the willingness to save and invest, and hence acknowledged as a determinant of long-run
comparative advantage. The paper consists of two parts. First, the authors develop a theoretical
model which predicts that institutions determine a country’s underlying comparative advantage:
countries that have good institutions will tend to export relatively more capital-intensive (or
sophisticated) goods compared with countries that have poor institutions; trade can magnify the
effect of institutional quality on income, leading to greater income divergence than if countries
remain in autarky. Second, using a panel of over eighty countries and twenty years of data, the
authors ﬁnd empirical support for their hypotheses.
JEL classiﬁcation: F11, F15, O11, P48
Bank classiﬁcation: International topics; Development economics
Résumé
Les changements institutionnels et la libéralisation des échanges sont généralement considérés
comme deux grandes sources de la croissance du revenu par habitant dans le monde. Cependant,
des travaux récents (p. ex., Rigobon et Rodrik, 2004) indiquent que le lien positif établi par
Frankel et Romer (1999) entre commerce et croissance s’estompe si l’on tient compte de la
qualité des institutions. Selon les auteurs de l’étude résumée ici, cette « énigme du commerce et
de la croissance » peut être résolue dès lors qu’on reconnaît que la qualité des institutions est l’un
des déterminants de la propension à épargner et à investir, et donc l’un des déterminants d’un
avantage comparatif durable. La première partie du document est consacrée à l’élaboration d’un
modèle théorique où l’avantage comparatif sous-jacent d’un pays dépend des institutions de celui-
ci. Selon ce modèle, les États dotés de bonnes institutions tendent à exporter des biens d’une
intensité capitalistique (complexité) relativement plus élevée que les États ayant de faibles
institutions. Le commerce pouvant ampliﬁer l’effet que la qualité des institutions a sur le revenu,
il accentue à terme les disparités de revenu qui auraient été observées si les nations étaient restées
autarciques. Dans la deuxième partie, les auteurs se livrent à une analyse des données de plus de
80 pays couvrant une période de 20 ans; leurs résultats corroborent leurs hypothèses.
Classiﬁcation JEL : F11, F15, O11, P48
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Questions internationales; Économie du développement  1 
1.  Introduction 
Conventional wisdom holds that institutional changes and trade liberalization are the two 
main factors behind the growth experiences of fast-growing economies, such as China 
and India. However, recent empirical research suggests that the channel through which 
trade affects income is still not well understood. For example, consider the Frankel and 
Romer (1999) finding that trade contributes positively to growth. While some authors 
continue to find evidence that this result holds (see, for example, Lee, Ricci, and Rigobon 
2004, or Dollar and Kraay 2004), it is increasingly being challenged. Research by 
Rigobon and Rodrik (2004), for example, suggests that the “trade and growth” finding is 
not robust to the inclusion of institutional quality, while Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi 
(2002) find that trade may even have a weakly negative affect on the level of income 
when institutional quality is controlled for in cross-country income regressions.  
 
Other research, such as by Slaughter (2001) and Dutt a nd Mukhopadhyay (2005), 
suggests that trade liberalization is a source of income divergence among countries, 
which would seem to link trade to the well-known Pritchett (1997) finding that per capita 
income levels between the richest and poorest nations diverged dramatically between 
1870 and 1985. As a result, it is not clear empirically to what extent trade liberalization is 
the underlying contributor to the recent performance of fast-growing poor countries, 
which we consider to be somewhat of a puzzle. 
 
Interestingly, there is no strong theoretical reason for presuming that trade liberalization 
should have a positive impact on income in all countries.
1 Indeed, although an extensive 
theoretical literature (see Baldwin 1992 and Findlay 1995, for example) suggests that 
factor accumulation is strongly influenced by trade and the long-run determinants of 
comparative advantage, this literature does not suggest that trade should lead to dynamic 
income gains among all trading partners.  Rather, the effect of trade on income is 
predicted to depend on a country’s comparative advantage. If a country has a comparative 
advantage in capital-intensive production, then these models of trade and dynamic factor 
                                                 
1 This paper is positive in nature. We do not consider welfare effects; hence, the usual arguments regarding 
welfare gains from trade are not explored.   2 
accumulation suggest that trade will result in increases in income levels over time. On the 
other hand, for a country with a comparative advantage in labour-intensive production, 
these models suggest that trade may encourage a rundown in the capital stock. Thus, 
standard trade theory provides an important first step towards understanding the 
relationship between trade and the changing distribution of world income, as well as 
some guidance as to how empirical models could be better specified to capture the effects 
that traditional theory predicts.  
 
The key question is what determines long-run comparative advantage. A rapidly growing 
literature that offers to tie the pieces of the puzzle together suggests that, in addition to its 
effect on long-run income levels, institutional quality plays an important part in 
determining comparative advantage. According to North,  
 
Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure human 
interaction. They are made up of formal constraints (rules, laws, 
constitutions), informal constraints (norms of behaviour, conventions, 
and s elf imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement 
characteristics. Together they define the incentive structure of societies 
and specifically economies. Institutions and the technology employed 
determine the transaction and transformation costs that add up to the 
costs of production. (North 1990) 
 
Since costs and incentives shape the production structure of the economy, institutions 
help determine a country’s comparative advantage. 
 
Institutions are well known to be particularly important in governing the behaviour of 
participants in financial markets that channel savings to investment opportunities. 
Problems of asymmetric information and conflict of interest between borrowers and 
lenders abound in these markets, resulting in potentially severe “agency costs.” From our 
point of view, good institutions, by mitigating these agency costs, can ultimately lower   3 
the costs of capital-intensive production and thus determine whether a country becomes 
capital abundant, and hence this can affect a country’s comparative advantage. 
 
We are not alone in highlighting the importance of institutions as a determinant of 
comparative advantage. For example, Nunn (2005) develops, and finds empirical support 
for, a static model of trade with incomplete contracts, which predicts that countries with 
better contracting environments should specialize in the production of goods that require 
relationship-specific investments. Similarly, using a static Heckscher-Ohlin model, 




In this paper, however, we use the link between institutions and comparative advantage in 
an attempt to offer a solution to the trade and income puzzle. Our story involves two 
steps. First, it demonstrates that institutions determine the cost of specializing in capital-
intensive production and are therefore a determinant of comparative advantage and long-
run income levels. In particular, we argue that countries that have good institutions will 
enjoy a lower cost of capital (and hence a comparative advantage in capital-intensive 
production) and higher income levels than countries that have poor institutions. Second, it 
follows that trade liberalization should be expected to magnify the effects of institutions 
on capital accumulation and income. Specifically, via the Stolper-Samuelson effect, in 
economies  that have good (bad) institutions, trade liberalization will raise (lower) the 
return to capital in the short run and, over time, encourage (discourage) capital 
accumulation and specialization in capital-intensive production. Consequently, we should 
expect trade liberalization to generate greater increases in income in countries that have 
better institutions compared with countries that have weak institutions.  
 
Our paper is organized as follows. To provide a framework to support our hypothesis, 
section  2 develops a theoretical model that links institutional quality, comparative 
advantage, trade, and income distribution. This model formally demonstrates that, first, 
                                                 
2 Antràs (2003) also makes an  important contribution to this literature.  He incorporates an incomplete 
contracting, property rights model of the firm into a standard monopolistic competition trade model to 
explain the determinants of intra-industry trade.   4 
institutional quality can act as an underlying determinant of comparative advantage. 
Interestingly, our model also predicts that countries can be ranked in such a way that 
countries that have good institutions will tend to export relatively more capital-intensive 
(or sophisticated) goods compared with countries that have poor institutions. This ranking 
is consistent with the concept of a chain of comparative advantage as proposed by Jones 
(1965) and Deardorff (1979), and Bhagwati’s (1997) ladder of comparative advantage. 
Second, through the process of specialization, our model demonstrates how trade 
magnifies the effects of institutional quality on income, and hence the mechanism 
through which trade can explain differences in income levels across economies.  
 
The third section of our paper is empirical. To test our hypothesis, we deal with two 
points separately. First, we look for, and find, evidence that institutional quality 
determines comparative advantage. To do this, we use a technique developed by Kwan 
(2002) to develop an index of export sophistication. This approach has been used by 
Desroches, Francis, and Painchaud (2004) and by Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2005) 
to rank countries in the chain or ladder of comparative advantage. We find that once the 
level of a country’s openness is controlled for, that institutional quality is positively 
associated with having a comparative advantage in relatively sophisticated goods. 
Second, we estimate transitional growth equations in search  of evidence that trade 
liberalization positively affects income conditional on the quality of institutions. Our 
results, which are robust to the choice of estimation technique, confirm our hypothesis 
and thus help to make light of Slaughter’s (2001) finding of income divergence among 
trade liberalizers. Moreover, we believe that our framework provides a simple way to 
rationalize the “trade” variable’s failure to perform consistently in traditional growth 
equations. A final section concludes.  
 
2.  The Theory 
Following the work of Manning (1981), Manning, Markusen, and Melvin (1993), Baxter 
(1992), Findlay (1995), and Brecher, Chen, and Choudhri (2002), our model combines a 
neo-classical Ramsey (exogenous) growth model with a standard neo-classical trade   5 
framework. However, there are two main differences between the model developed here 
and that developed elsewhere in the literature. First, we allow for cross-country 
differences in rental rates owing to differences in institutional quality. Second, making 
use of the Heckscher-Ohlin model developed by Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson 
(1980) (hereafter denoted DFS), we extend the analysis to a two-country, many-goods 
framework.  
 
2.1  The autarkic economy 
To start with, we consider the case of an autarkic economy in which institutional quality 
plays a role in determining equilibrium factor prices and hence the country’s underlying 
comparative advantage. We leave for the next subsection the question of how the 
movement from autarky to free trade between two economies affects steady-state income. 
Thus, we consider (in this subsection) a closed economy  that produces a continuum of 
consumption goods indexed by z,  1 0 £ £ z , and a capital good denoted by the letter c. All 
goods are produced according to a neo-classical constant-returns-to-scale production 
function using capital, K, and labour, L. Letting y(z) and k(z) denote output and capital 
per worker used in production of good z, and similarly for y(c) and k(c), we write,  
 
  )) ( ( ) ( z k f z y z =               (1) 
and  
) ( ) ( c c k f c y = .               (1a) 
 
Following DFS, the consumption goods are indexed in order of capital intensity, with 
zero being the most capital intensive and one being the most labour intensive. There are 
no factor-intensity reversals. 
 
Firms 
Operating in a perfectly competitive market, firms hire capital and labour so as to equate 
the value of their marginal products with the market rental and wage rates, respectively. 
Letting p(z) denote the price of good z, and R and W be the market rental and wages rates, 
we have,    6 
R z k f z p z = ¢ )) ( ( ) ( ,              (2) 
 
W z k f z k z k f z p z z = ¢ - ))] ( ( ) ( )) ( ( )[ ( ,          (3) 
 
with similar equations for the capital-producing sector. 
 
Theft 
In order to introduce institutional quality into this framework, we assume that a fraction 
of capital earnings, (1-a), is stolen by firm managers. Firm managers do not anticipate 
that their actions affect market prices in any way and treat the proceeds of theft as a 
lump-sum transfer, T. As a result, capital owners (who may also be managers or workers) 
receive a return on capital equal to a of capital’s marginal product. That is,  
 
R R a = ˆ .                 (4) 
 
We posit that the value of a (0<a= 1) depends positively on the quality of institutions 
designed to protect the rights of investors.
3, 4  
 
Households 
A key feature of our model is that we incorporate household savings into our model. 
Thus, we allow households to optimally choose their consumption bundles in each period 
                                                 
3 This approach mirrors the traditional approach of introducing the distortionary effects of capital taxation 
(see Blanchard and Fischer 1989).  It is assumed that managers do not take into account the aggregate 
impact that they have on the return to capital and hence the representative household does not “internalize” 
the distorting pecuniary externality that theft causes.  This is simply one of many ways in which poor 
institutions could conceivably be introduced into the Ramsey model. We could also assume that managers 
compete for the rents from theft, with the result that a part of the economy’s endowment of labour is used 
up in rent-seeking activities; however, this would not significantly change our results. An alternative 
approach would involve modelling the theft of capital earnings as an optimizing behaviour of managers 
faced with imperfect monitoring (see, for example, Johnson et al. 2000). Yet another approach is taken by  
Linder and Strulik (2004), who assume that private property rights over final output are absent and thus 
treated as an open-access good in the Ramsey model.  This assumption, like ours, results in excessive 
consumption and suboptimal savings.  
4 Institutional quality may be endogenous (see IMF 2005 for a discussion), and the decision to adopt and 
enforce property rights may be a function of openness (see, for example, Francis 2005).  Although our 
empirical section takes endogeneity problems into account, the objective of this paper is to illustrate that 
institutional quality is a determinant of comparative advantage and hence the long-run level of income. The 
assumptions in our theory section are made with this objective in mind.   7 
and their level of savings. Specifically, we follow DFS and assume that the instantaneous 
utility function, U, takes the form  ￿ =
1
0 )] ( )[ln ( dz z d z b U , where b(z) is the expenditure 
share and d(z) is the per capita consumption demand for good z.
5 In addition to choosing 
their consumption in each period, we allow for household savings. In keeping with the 
Ramsey model of optimal savings, we assume that, subject to the household budget 
constraint, which requires the sum of consumption expenditure and savings to equal 
income, the infinitely lived representative household maximizes the present value of 
utility from consumption of the continuum of consumption goods. Thus, the 
representative household maximizes  ￿
¥ -
0 Udt e
t r  subject to the constraint that 
  ˆ ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
1
0 T k R W nk c p k c p dz z d z p + + = - + ￿
& , where r is the rate of time preference, k 
is the per capita capital stock,  k &is the accumulation of capital per capita,  n is the 
population growth rate, R ˆ  is the nominal return on capital realized by the household, and 




In steady state, the Ramsey rule for intertemporal optimization arising from the 
households’ maximization problem implies that  n c p R + = r ) ( / ˆ . As a result, substituting 
using equations (2) and (4), we obtain a variation on the Ramsey rule for optimal savings, 
       
a r / ) ( )) ( ( n c k f c + = ¢ .            (5) 
 
Equation (5) is the key equilibrium condition upon which the rest of the equilibrium 
conditions for the economy depend. Equation (5) solves uniquely for k(c), and hence 
together with (2) and (3) it can be determined that (5), in turn, also solves for the 
equilibrium wage to rental ratio, which we shall denote by s : 
                                                 
5 By ensuring that the utility function is homothetic, we can focus on the problem of the representative 
household.   
6 In setting up our problem we take prices as fixed.  This is a shortcoming of our approach, because it does 
not take into account endogenous changes in the price of capital and hence the prospect of capital gain.  
However, our objective is to focus on the steady state in which prices are constant.   8 
)) ( (
))] ( ( ( )) ( ( [
/
c k f






= ” s .        (6) 
 
It follows that that an improvement in the quality of institutions (i.e., a higher value of a) 
results in a higher wage to rental ratio. With the wage to rental ratio determined, equation 
(6a) determines the equilibrium value of k(z) for all z: 
 
)) ( (
))] ( ( ) ( )) ( ( [
z k f





= s .          (6a)   
   
With wages, rental rates, and the factor intensities of production all determined by the 
Ramsey rule, unit production costs are also determined, and thus the competitive supply 
price in each industry follows from the zero-profit condition p(z)Y(z)= [WL(z)+RK(z)]. 
Relative prices of good z in terms of good z' can therefore be written as follows: 
 
 
)) ' ( )( (
)) ( )( (
) ' (
) (
z k z a








,            (7) 
 
where  az is the unit labour requirement for good z,  ))] ( ( /[ 1 z k f a z z = . 
 
The equilibrium for the diversified autarkic economy can be illustrated most simply using 
the Lerner-Pearce diagram. We show for convenience just two consumption  goods and 
the one capital good, but there is a continuum of consumption  goods (which we avoid 
illustrating so as to not clutter our diagram!). In Figure 1, the parameters r and a solve 
for the wage to rental ratio and fix the slope of the unit isocost line, labelled AA´. In 
autarky, when all goods are domestically produced, the relative price of each must adjust 
to ensure equilibrium. Thus, the relative price of, say, good i will adjust, shifting the unit 
isoquant inwards (as pi rises) or outwards (as pi falls), until such time as losses or profits, 
respectively, have been eliminated and the unit isoquant, Vi, is just tangent to the unit 
isocost AA line. The resulting set of equilibrium relative prices is the only set of prices 
that is consistent with  the  long-run competitive supply of all goods in the domestic 
economy. The resulting equilibrium capital to labour ratios in each sector are also   9 




Figure 1: The Lerner-Pearce Diagram 
 
An interesting aspect of these types of models is that, since capital is endogenous, the 
labour constraint is the only binding resource constraint in the long-run equilibrium. 
Making use of Jones’s (1965) analysis of the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model, the long-
run production possibility constraint for the economy can be determined from the labour 
constraint,  L c L dz z L = + ￿ ) ( ) (
1
0 , and the unit labour requirement,  a(z), a (c), for each 
good. That is, the production possibilities frontier is defined by the following constraint: 
 
dz c Y c a dz z Y z a L ￿ + =
1
0 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( . 
 
Next, we make use of the zero-profit conditions and the l abour constraint to determine 
the equilibrium capital to labour ratio employed in the non-capital-producing sector. We 
use the subscript T to denote the non-capital, consumption-goods-producing sector (later 
this will be the traded goods sector). Zero profit requires that expenditure on a good equal 
K 
L 







k(2)   10 
the cost of production.  That is,  b(z)[WLT +RKT] = [ WL(z)+RK(z)], or 
)] ( [










. Combining this with the labour constraint facing the non-capital-
producing sector,  T L dz z L = ￿
1
0 ) ( , gives: 









k z b T
s
s
.             (8) 
 
Clearly, with s and k(z) fixed by the Ramsey rule, equation (8) solves for kT.  
 





0 0 )] ( [
)] ( [
) (




.          (8a) 
 
This leaves us to determine the equilibrium size of the capital stock for the economy (and 
implicitly the equilibrium outputs of the economy). In steady state,  nk L c L c k f c = / ) ( )) ( ( . 














L c T -
= ,  
 
) ( T c c
T c




= ,              (9)  
 
the right-hand side of which must be positive in the steady state, because output of the 
capital-producing sector must be greater than the capital requirements of the capital 
sector itself. 
 
This completes the description of the autarkic steady-state equilibrium. We next perform 
some simple comparative statics. 
 
 
   11 
Comparative statics in the autarkic economy 
It is instructive at this point to consider the effect of a change in institutional quality. 
Suppose that institutional quality improves to  a a > ¢ . In the short run, with a fixed stock 
of capital, the benefits of a fall in a accumulate to the owners of the fixed factor. As such, 
there is no immediate pressure for firms to change the  factor intensity of production. 
However, with  a r ¢ > ¢ / ) ( c c k f , there is now an incentive to save. Households therefore 
increase their savings, resulting in an expansion in the capital stock. As is well known 
from the Rybczynski theorem, the capital-intensive sectors of the economy would (on the 
whole) expand at the expense of the labour-intensive sectors. Meanwhile, as capital 
accumulation results in increased GDP, the assumption of homothetic tastes ensures that 
the demand for all goods would rise proportionately. Thus, in an autarkic economy, the 
price of capital-intensive goods would have to fall relative to the price of labour-intensive 
goods to restore equilibrium in the goods market. The change in relative price reduces the 
demand for capital relative to labour, producing a Stolper-Samuelson result, which 
lowers the rental rate on capital relative to the wage rate. The process continues until 
a r ¢ = ¢ ¢ / ) ( c c k f .  The following proposition summarizes the results. 
 
Proposition 1: An increase in a results in an increase in  T k , k , and s , and a change in 
relative prices such that  ) ( ) ( j i z p z p , zi<zj, falls (that is, the price of capital-intensive 
consumption goods falls relative to the price of labour-intensive consumption goods). 
Proof: See Appendix A. 
 
2.2  Free trade equilibrium in a North–South model: comparative  
  advantage and the pattern of trade 
In this section, we introduce a second country to examine how trade between two 
countries with different levels of institutional quality affects steady-state income.  We 
shall refer to the country with better institutions as the North and the other country as the 
South, denoted by the superscripts N and S, respectively.  For convenience, we assume 
that institutional quality (i.e., the value of a) is the only difference between the two 
countries.  From Proposition 1, we know that in autarky,  s
N >  s




j i z p z p z p z p ) ) ( ) ( ( ) ) ( ) ( ( < ,  zi<zj.  Thus, we have the following corollary to 
Proposition 1: 
 
Corollary (comparative advantage): in the autarkic equilibrium, the North has a 
comparative advantage in capital-intensive production compared with the South. 
 
Moreover, since the value of s is fixed by the choice of a and r, the equilibrium values 
of s  will be unaffected in the long run by the nature of the trading regime. Consequently, 
under free trade, the pattern of trade will be consistent with the “chain of comparative 
advantage” as proposed by Jones (1956–57) and Bhagwati (1972), and rigorously 
analyzed by Deardorff (1979). When countries face different real rental rates, Deardorff 
(1979) explains that the neo-classical trade model predicts that, under free trade 
conditions, the resulting pattern of trade could be described as a “chain of goods ranked 
by capital intensity, … broken into segments, one for each country, and the segments are 




Given that firms in countries with better economic institutions can be expected to face 
lower rental rates, our framework offers a simple explanation of how the ranking of 
countries is determined and predicts that countries with good institutions will find 
themselves specialized in the production of capital-intensive (or more sophisticated) 
exports relative to those with weak institutions.
8  
 
To illustrate, consider Figure 2. The North’s isocost line is illustrated by the line AA', 
while the South’s is illustrated by BB'. Lying along AA' is the set of tangency points 
between the isocost and isoquants for each good produced in the North, and, similarly, 
                                                 
7  For the purposes of this paper, the country ordering offered by Deardorff’s “chain of comparative 
advantage” is referred to as the “ladder of comparative advantage,” with countries that have the highest 
capital to labour ratio, and that therefore specialize in the production of those goods with the highest capital 
intensity, at the top of the ladder, and those that have a low capital to labour ratio at the bottom.   
8 For the interested reader, the theoretical foundations of the paper are explained in more detail in 
Appendix A. 
   13 
lying along BB' is the set of tangency points for each good produced in the South. We 
next consider trade. Since the capital good is non-traded, we consider trade only in the 
continuum of consumption goods, z. When trade is permitted, Deardorff’s analysis tells 
us that production will be broken up into two distinct segments determined by the 
intersection of AA' and BB', at point M, with the North specializing in capital-intensive 
production along AM and labour-intensive production occurring in the South with the 
equilibrium tangencies lying along MB'. Trade therefore involves the North specializing 
in capital-intensive goods z,  z z £ £ 0 , and the South specializing in the production of z, 
1 £ £ z z .  
 
Corollary: (the pattern of trade): under free trade, the North specializes in the production 
of capital-intensive goods and the South in labour-intensive goods. 
 
 








B´   14 
The “borderline” good,  z , (illustrated by point M) is determined by the interaction of 
supply and demand. As was illustrated above, the supply-side parameters for each 
economy (the equilibrium wage to rental ratios, sectoral capital to labour ratios, and unit 
costs) are determined by the quality of institutions. The demand side determines the 
equilibrium outputs in each country and the overall size of the capital stock consistent 
with those demands.  
 
To complete the description of the free trade equilibrium, it remains for us to determine 
the equilibrium values of kT ,z , and k for each country. First, consider the North. The 
equilibrium capital and labour constraints can be written as follows: 
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or alternatively as, 
 











N z N )] ( /[ ) )( ( ) ( 1
0 + + + = ￿ ,    (11a) 
 











N z N )] ( /[ ) )( ( ) ( 1
0 + + + = ￿ .    (12a) 
 
Subtracting (11a) and (12a) from one another and dividing through by world expenditure 
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for the South. 
 
As with the autarkic case, equations (13) and (14) solve for 
N
T k  and 
S
T k . However, in this 
case the equilibrium value of each will depend on the value of  z , which is determined by 
the requirement that trade be balanced, 
 
￿ ￿ + = +
1
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2.3  Trade liberalization 
Having formally illustrated one way in which institutional quality may work to determine 
the capital intensity or sophistication of a country’s exports, and how institutional quality 
leads to a ranking of countries according to their comparative advantage, we turn to the 
next key question in our paper: How does trade liberalization affect steady-state income? 
An important feature of our model is the fact that the equilibrium wages to rental ratio, 
and the capital intensity of production for each good z, remain unchanged as a result of a 
movement from autarky to free trade. What does change when trade takes place is the 
range of goods produced, and the overall capital stock. Intuitively, one would expect that 
moving from autarky to free trade would induce capital accumulation in the North (since 
the North specializes in capital-intensive production) and a rundown of the capital stock 
in the South (since the South specializes in labour-intensive production). 
   16 
Formally, we have the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2 (impact of trade): Under free trade, the steady-state capital stock in the 
North (South) is higher (lower) than in autarky. 
 
Proof: 
A comparison of equation (8a) with (13) and (14) suggests that to determine the effect of 
trade liberalization in the North requires considering how the value of 
N
T k  changes when 
the range of goods produced in the North falls from all goods to a subset of capital-
intensive goods.  
 
Thus, to prove Proposition 2, let the range of goods produced in the North be denoted 
N z z £ £ 0 , and differentiate (13) to see how 
N
T k changes when 
N z  falls from 1 to  z . 
 
Totally differentiating (13),  
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,        (17) 
 
which is negative, given that the capital to labour ratio of the most labour-intensive 
traded good produced in the North must be less than the North’s aggregate capital to 
labour ratio of the traded-goods sector. This implies that as 
N z  falls from 1 to  z , 
N
T k  
rises. 
 
Similarly, with the South being specialized in the production of labour-intensive goods, 
let  1 £ £ z z
S denote the range of goods produced in the South. It follows that 
 




T ,                (18) 
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which implies that as 
S z  rises from 0 to  z , 
S
T k  falls. In other words, moving from 
autarky to free trade results in capital accumulation in the North and a rundown of the 
capital stock in the South.
9 
 
3.  Institutions, Comparative Advantage, Trade, and 
Transitional Growth: The Empirics 
 
This section of our paper is empirical. In keeping with the previous section, we first look 
for empirical evidence that institutional quality is a determinant of a country’s underlying 
comparative advantage. We then ask whether there is empirical evidence that trade 
liberalization interacts with institutional quality to affect the level of per capita income in 
the non-linear manner we predict. That is, we ask whether trade liberalization contributes 
to (detracts from) short- to medium-term growth in per capita GDP in countries that have 
relatively good (weak) institutions, as is predicted in our model from the previous 
section.  In doing so, we also examine whether there is evidence that improvements in 
institutional quality contribute to short-run growth. 
 
3.1  Comparative advantage and institutional quality 
In this section, we examine the proposition that institutional quality is an underlying 
determinant of comparative advantage.  To test this proposition, we use scores of export 
sophistication based on Kwan (2002) (see also Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik 2005). 
The export sophistication index (ESI) provides a score that reflects a country’s relative 
position in the chain of comparative advantage – a higher score reflects exports of greater 
sophistication than goods with a lower score.
10 We then use this ranking to test whether 
better institutions are associated with higher levels of export sophistication. 
 
                                                 
9 It should be stressed that our results do not imply that trade immiserizes the South. In the short run (not 
analyzed in our model), both countries enjoy the usual, static gains from trade. In the long run, the cost of 
lower GDP is offset to some degree by gains in terms of higher consumption (a lower savings rate) in the 
transition to the new steady state.  Thus, we posit that, although the South ends up in a steady state with 
lower per capita GDP, the present value of welfare may have increased. A rigorous treatment of this issue 
would require an examination of welfare along the saddle path to the free trade equilibrium following trade 
liberalization. Such an analysis, while interesting, is beyond the scope of this paper. 
10 The ESI scores used in this paper are from Desroches, Francis, and Painchaud (2004).   18 
The export sophistication score for a country is determined in two steps. The first step 
involves calculating a product sophistication index (PSI) for each good traded in the 
global economy (DFP use 3-digit SITC trade data).
11 The PSI number for each good 
reveals the expected per capita GDP of countries that export that good. Goods with low 
(high) PSI scores tend to be exported by countries with low (high) per capita GDPs. That 




i ij j PCGDP x PSI , 
 
where xij is country i’s share of world exports in good j.  
 
These data are then used to calculate ESI scores for each country in the data set. The ESI 
score for each country is simply the mean PSI value of its exports.
12 That is, for country i,  
￿ =
j
j ij i PSI y ESI  , 
where yij is the share of good j in country i’s total exports.  
 
Figure 3 illustrates a simple scatter plot of ESI against the quality of the legal system and 
property rights, and the quality of investor protection. Interestingly, Figure 3 suggests 
that institutions may shape the nature of comparative advantage in the manner that we 
predict. It is, however, by no means conclusive – obviously, we would like to control for 
other factors that may be correlated with institutional quality, such as per capita GDP. To 
this end, we estimate a simple instrumental variables regression of the following form: 
 
time Z y X ESI t i t i t i t i 5 , 4 , 3 , 1 2 1 , ) ln( f f f f f + + + + = ,      (3.1a) 
 
where X1 t i, is a measure of institutional quality in country i at time t; y t i,  is log per capita 
GDP in country i at time t; Z t i,  is a measure of human capital (average years of secondary 
schooling); and time is a time dummy. 
                                                 
11 This methodology is based on Kwan (2002). 
12 The reader is directed to Desroches, Francis, and Painchaud (2004) and Kwan (2002) for more details on 
the calculation of PSI and ESI scores.   19 
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Our theory predicts that the sign on institutional quality should be positive. However, we 
may also want to take into account each country’s openness (defined as imports plus 
exports as a share of GDP) and, more importantly, the interaction between openness and 
institutional quality. The latter term is important because we use an export-based measure 
to reveal comparative advantage. In the presence of tariffs (or other trade restrictions), 
one would expect the range of goods that a country exports to become broader, as the 
economy becomes more open, and this should affect its ESI score in a systematic manner. 
In the case of a relatively closed economy with a comparative advantage in sophisticated 
goods (say, as the economy is opened up), one would expect the range of goods that it 
exports to expand from being only those in which it has the greatest cost advantage to 
those in which its cost advantage is more marginal. Thus, as the trade is liberalized, for 
an economy with good institutions, we would expect its ESI score to fall! That is, we 
expect that a country’s ESI score (i.e., the average level of sophistication of the country’s 
exports) should depend positively on the quality of that country’s institutions, but that 
score should be offset somewhat by the degree of openness. That is, we expect f2 to be 
negatively affected by the degree of openness (log of the sum of exports and imports as a 
share of GDP, denoted X2), or,  ) ( 2 2 1 2 X q q f + =  where q1>0, q2<0 , but f2> 0. Thus, we 
rewrite equation (3.1) as:  
 
time Z y
X X X ESI
t i t i
t i t i t i t i
5 , 4 , 3





    (3.1b) 
 
We estimate equation (3.1b) using an instrumental variable estimation using observations 
for ESI calculated in 1985 and 2001 (the first and last years in our data set). The results 
are reported in Table 1. We want to be reasonably confident that our interaction term 
reflects how the coefficient on institutional quality is affected by the degree of openness 
(rather than how institutional quality affects the coefficient on openness), so three sets of 
regressions are provided (labelled groups 1, 2, and 3). The first set has openness entering 
in both the interaction term and separately; in the second, openness enters in the 
interaction term and an indicator of tariff levels is included separately. In the third, we 
omit any measure of openness, except in the interaction term, since our model would   21 
suggest no obvious role for this variable other than as a control. In each subgroup of 
regressions (subgroups a, b, c, and d), our two different measures of institutional quality 
are used in different combinations.
13 In columns a and b of each subgroup, the same 
measure of institutional quality (legal system and property rights and investor protection, 
respectively) is used in both the interaction term and the separate term. In columns c and 
d, we allow the institutional quality measure used in the interaction term and separate 
term to differ from one another. Although the interpretation of the coefficients in this 
case is different from that explained above, the results are included as a robustness check, 
and also because there may be some multicollinearity problems with the institutional 
variables and the interaction term.
14 
 
The results are broadly consistent with what our theory would predict. In each subgroup 
of equations, with the exception of column c, the quality of institutions has the expected 
positive sign and is statistically significant, suggesting that institutional quality is, after 
controlling for educational quality and  per  capita GDP, positively associated with 
exporting higher-value-added goods. The interaction term has the expected negative 
coefficient and is generally statistically significant. Given the importance of institutional 
quality in determining comparative advantage, this result suggests that trade restrictions 
do, in fact, reduce the competitiveness of those goods in which a country’s comparative 
advantage is weakest. Equation c in each subgroup, however, indicates that our results are 
not as robust as we would like: the interaction term has the expected sign,  but  the 
coefficient on the institutional quality term sometimes has the wrong sign, although it is 
not significant. Furthermore, although our results are qualitatively similar across groups, 
the quantitative results tend to vary. Nevertheless, we find the results to be encouraging 
and, on the whole, supportive of our hypothesis that institutional quality is an important 
determinant of comparative advantage. With this finding in mind, we next ask whether 
                                                 
13 A third measure of institutional variable (law and order) was also included. The results are qualitatively 
the same and are available from the authors. 
14 In the next section, which uses a fuller data set because of the availability of more data, the interpretation 
of the interaction term favours using the two different measures for institutional quality. Moreover, it 
alleviates what appears to be significant multicollinearity problems between the two terms when the same 
institutional quality measure is used.    22 
Table 1: The Determinants of Comparative Advantage 
Dependent Variable: ln(ESI) 











































































Institutional quality (a)  0.282**  0.393*  -0.022  0.076*    0.074**  0.129***  0.004  0.110*    0.060**  0.103***  -0.005  0.079* 
   0.121  0.202*  0.024  0.042    0.035  0.046  0.028  0.061    0.029  0.038  0.025  0.042 
Inst x ln(openness) (b)  -0.074**  -0.090  0.010  -0.013*    -0.020***  -0.019***  -0.011**  -0.016**    -0.016***  -0.014***  -0.007*  -0.015*** 
   0.030  0.048  0.008  0.007    0.006  0.006  0.005  0.007    0.005  0.005  0.004  0.005 
ln(openness)  0.361*  0.562  -0.173**  -0.029    -  -  -  -    -  -  -  - 
   0.186  0.340  0.075  0.061                      
tariff  -  -  -  -    -0.004*  -0.003  -0.004  0.001    -  -  -  - 
             0.002  0.003  0.003  0.003            
ln(education)  -0.004  -0.097  0.055  0.122    0.079  0.032  0.064  0.152    -0.034  -0.031  -0.005  0.154 
   0.113  0.114  0.108  0.134    0.104  0.110  0.139  0.163    0.088  0.100  0.119  0.125 
ln(per capita GDP)  0.125***  0.115**  0.080*  0.061    0.060  0.040  0.081  0.047    0.126***  0.086***  0.131***  0.058 
   0.042  0.057  0.045  0.056    0.051  0.054  0.054  0.075    0.033  0.046  0.041  0.058 
time dummy  -0.285***  -0.259  -0.237  -0.212    -0.225***  -0.182***  -0.263***  -0.185*    -0.287***  -0.230***  -0.306***  -0.210*** 
   0.039  0.060  0.046  0.057    0.049  0.055  0.049  0.077    0.033  0.046  0.042  0.059 
const  7.558***  6.552  9.734  9.193    9.484***  9.192***  9.603***  8.987***    8.946***  8.886****  9.098***  9.129*** 
   0.790  1.401  0.368  0.336    0.376  0.427  0.441  0.575    0.230  0.277  0.283  0.331 
No. obs.  119  115  115  115    119  115  115  115    119  115  115  115 
 
 
Notes:  Std errors in italics.   
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there is evidence that trade has an effect on growth that is conditional on institutional 
quality. 
 
3.2    The interaction of trade with institutions and transitional 
  growth 
 
Empirically, it is increasingly unclear what impact trade has on income over time. The 
most well known finding in the literature is that of Frankel and Romer (1999), who 
demonstrate that openness to trade has a large and beneficial impact on income. It is a 
finding that is often repeated in the literature.
15 More recently, however, authors such as 
Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2002) have questioned this result, arguing that 
institutions, not trade, are the source of growth. Rigobon and Rodrik (2004) even find 
evidence to suggest that trade contributes negatively to growth when institutional quality 
is accounted for. Thus, Frankel and Romer’s results do not seem to be robust to changes 
in the specification that includes institutional quality.  
 
Traditionally, when examining the relationship between trade, institutions, and growth, 
researchers have estimated a specification such as:  
 
t i it it it t i i i t i u X X X y y , 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 , 0 , ) 1 ( + + + + - + = D - b b b b a ,    (3.2a) 
 
where yi,t is the log of real per capita GDP in country i, ai is a country-specific constant, 
X1it is a measure of institutional quality, X2i,t is a measure of openness in country i at time 
t, and X 1i,t is a vector of country-specific control variables. Empirically, to take into 
account that an economy is growing towards its steady-state level, the lagged value of yi,t 
is also included. Lastly, u i,t is an unobserved error term.  
 
According to the theory presented in section 2, however, the effect of trade on growth 
may also depend on the level of institutional quality (see Appendix  B), such that 
openness generates growth when trade occurs in an environment where institutions are 
                                                 
15 For example, Lee, Ricci, and Rigobon (2004) find that trade has had a positive impact on growth using 
Rigobon’s  (2003) “identification through heteroscedasticity” approach.   24 
better. Such an interaction can be easily incorporated in (3.2a) by assuming that b2= 
(g1+g2X1). Thus, a specification such as: 
 
t i i i i i
i t i i t i t i
X X X X
X y y
, 3 3 2 1 2 2 1
1 1 1 , 0 ,
*
) 1 (
m b g g
b b h a
+ + + +
+ - + + = D -
       (3.2b) 
 
is more appropriate. In terms of our theoretical model, our prior expectation is that trade 
should have a positive impact on growth (b2 > 0) when institutions are good, but negative 
(b2 < 0) when institutions are weak. That is, g1 <0 and g2 >0. Note, however, that our 
specification also requires that -(g1/g2 )<max(X2), because X2 is bounded.  
 
As recommended by Bond (2002), we use a dynamic generalized method of moments 
(GMM) system estimator approach to estimate equation (3.2b).
16 Briefly, the technique 
involves undertaking the following steps. First, the growth regression is expressed as a 
dynamic model in the level of real  per capita GDP.
17 Second, we difference the 
regression equation in order to eliminate the country-specific effects. Third, we 
instrument the explanatory variables using lagged values of the levels and differences of 
the original regressors and dependent variable. The latter step eliminates the potential 
inconsistency coming from the endogeneity of the explanatory variables, while 
differencing eliminates the potential inconsistency resulting from the correlation between 
the unobserved country-specific effects and the explanatory variables. 
 
As mentioned previously, in estimating (3.2b) we also control for determinants of growth 
other than institutions and openness. Real per capita GDP represents the initial conditions 
(i.e., the state variable), and as such, this variable is measured at the beginning of each 
five-year period. Other explanatory variables (X3) include investment as a share of GDP, 
share of government consumption in GDP, and the rate of inflation.
18 All these variables 
                                                 
16 The system estimator is preferred to the difference estimator when the regressors are close to an AR(1) 
process. This is especially pertinent for the estimation-of-growth equation. 
17 The lagged dependent variables can be introduced to either fixed- or random-effects models. 
18 Other variables, such  as  financial development, were considered, but their coefficients were not 
statistically significant. This is consistent with results found in the literature (Dalgaard, Hansen, and Tarp 
2004).   25 
are measured as averages over five-year periods and represent the control variables.
19 The 
unobservable country-specific effects,  i a , are designed to capture the determinants of a 
country’s steady state that do not vary over time and that are not already contained in the 
other explanatory variables. The methodology employed allows us to estimate the 
coefficients without having to restrict the individual effects to being either fixed or 
random. The time-specific effect, t h , captures the effects of global shocks on economic 
growth common to all countries.
20 
 
In Table 2 we report results from  four regressions that use various combinations of 
institutional quality for the institutions term and the interaction term.
21 Because investor 
protection is the primary institutional variable of interest, we limit ourselves to 
combinations that include this most economic of  institutional variables. Overall, the 
results tend to tell a reasonably straightforward story. In each case, institutional quality, 
independent of the degree of openness, is seen to have a positive and statistically 
significant impact on  income dynamics. The impact of trade, however, clearly depends 
on the quality of institutions, with the interaction term being positive and highly 
significant in all of our regressions. None of our regressions suggests that trade, in the 
absence of some degree of institutional quality, has a statistically positive impact on 
growth. Rather, the results generally support our view that trade has a positive impact on 
income in countries with relatively good institutions and a negative impact on income in 
countries with relatively poor institutions. For middle institution countries, our results 
suggest that the impact of trade on income is somewhat ambiguous.
22  
                                                 
19 For a definition and sources of all the variables and countries, see Appendixes B and C, respectively. 
20 Because of additional data constraints, the number of countries in our data set falls from 119, in our 
analysis used to estimate the relationship between institutional quality and ESI, to 87 in our growth 
regressions. 
21 When only our institutional quality measure or the interaction term is in the regression, the coefficients 
are always positive and significant. However, when we use the same institutional quality measure in the 
interaction term and to capture the direct effect of institutional quality, there are cases where the 
coefficients become insignificant. Because of multicollinearity problems, it proved useful to use a different 
measure of institutional quality in the interaction term from that used to capture the direct effects of 
institutional quality. Since we are interested in how the growth effects of trade are affected by institutional 
quality (rather than how the effects of institutional quality are affected by trade), this is not problematic.   
22 It should be stressed that our results are positive in nature.  They omit a clear measure of the static gains from 
trade and say very little about the welfare (i.e., normative) implications of opening an economy up to trade. Thus, 
one cannot conclude that trade reduces welfare, even in the case of countries with relatively poor institutions.     26 
Figure 4 illustrates the impact of trade on growth for different levels of institutional 
quality (legal system and property rights). Since our institutional quality measure (X2) is 
bounded, equation (3.2b) requires that -(g1/g2 )<max(X2). The threshold implied by our 
model for this measure of institutional quality is 6.9 (out of a possible score of 12). 
Countries with an index of institutional quality higher than 6.9 would see a positive 
economic impact of trade on their growth, and countries with an index lower than the 
threshold would experience a negative economic impact of openness to trade on their 
growth. Figure 4 shows that all high-income countries (real GDP per capita higher than 
US$15,000) that have relatively good institutions would benefit from increased openness 
to trade. Other countries, such as Jordan and Tunisia, despite having a relatively low level 
of income per capita (real GDP per capita lower than US$3,500), have a relatively good 
level of institutional quality and would consequently benefit from more openness to 
trade. 
 
Our results are still valid when using other estimation techniques. In Appendix D, we 
report the  ordinary least squares results (Table  D1) as well as the results from the 
instrumental variables (IV) approach (Table D2). Also, in order to take into account the 
non-linear dynamics of the interaction variables (since the institutional quality variables 
are bounded), we estimate a model with non-linearity introduced for the interaction 
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Table 2 
Growth Regressions: The Interaction Between Institutions and Trade 
GMM System Estimator* 
    1  2  3  4 
 
i. Institutions var. 









  GDP per capita  -2.11  -1.85  -3.41  -3.56 
    0.09  0.16  0.01  0.01 
  Population growth  -2.03  -1.71  -2.13  -2.17 
    0.21  0.26  0.13  0.12 
  Inflation  -1.01  -0.77  -0.84  -0.82 
    0.01  0.08  0.03  0.04 
  Capital formation  17.80  13.32  19.55  19.22 
    0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  Government expenditure  -5.54  -5.85  -6.10  -5.95 
    0.11  0.08  0.06  0.07 
  Trade openness  -5.88  -2.26  -4.55  -4.11 
    0.04  0.44  0.10  0.12 
  Institutional quality (a)  1.23  2.90  2.50  2.36 
    0.19  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  Openness x institutions interaction (b)  0.72  0.33  0.54  0.59 
    0.00  0.15  0.00  0.00 
  Constant  -10.64  -14.71  -13.93  -14.64 
    0.58  0.42  0.45  0.45 
           
  Hansen test (p-value)  0.885  0.829  0.955  0.962 
  AR(1) test for residuals (p-value)  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  AR(2) test for residuals (p-value)  0.067  0.066  0.033  0.033 
            
 
 
Notes: LO = Law and order. IP = Investor protection. LSPR = Legal system and property rights. 
* Coefficients for time dummies and lagged dependent variable are not reported. P-values are shown in italics.   28 
 
 




4.  Conclusion 
In this paper we examine the determinants of  long-run income levels with a particular 
focus on institutions, comparative advantage, and trade. Our central argument is that in 
order to understand how institutions and trade contribute to changes in income over time 
(or transitional growth) and across countries, one must understand how institutional 
quality affects long-run comparative advantage and, hence, the extent to which trade can 
magnify the benefits of institutional reform. To date, the existing literature has 
overlooked this interaction, and hence an important piece of the trade and growth puzzle 
has been omitted from the analysis. 
 
The evidence we find, both theoretical and empirical, suggests that (i) institutional quality 
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stimulate transitional growth by improving the quality of its institutions, although, when 
institutions are poor, a country may not enjoy the dynamic gains from trade liberalization. 
Indeed, our results provide strong evidence to suggest that trade affects growth 
conditional on the quality of institutions,  in that countries  that have good institutions 
experience faster growth resulting from trade,  whereas trade apparently weakens the 
growth performance of countries that have weak institutions. This is consistent with our 
view that weak institutions distort the capital accumulation process, and that trade can 
magnify the effect of the distortion.  
 
An interesting implication of our paper is that, to date, trade has not been an engine of 
growth for countries with middle levels of institutional quality (such as China and India), 
but rather institutional reform may have been more important for these types of 
economies.
23 Our results therefore reinforce earlier findings in the literature that there is a 
need for ongoing institutional reform in developing economies. Interestingly, just as our 
model suggests that trade can magnify the impact of weak institutions, our results also 
suggest that the effect of institutional reform is magnified in more open economies. Thus, 
relatively open economies have the most to gain from institutional reform. 
 
We conclude by stressing that our analysis is not a welfare analysis. In our theoretical 
section, which compares long-run steady state equilibria, we make no attempt to measure 
the present discounted value of the gains from trade. Thus, our analysis says little about 
the welfare implications of trade liberalization and institutional reform—an interesting 
issue that could be pursued further. Another shortcoming of our work is that it focuses on 
institutions that are likely to affect borrower-lender relationships, but the literature has 
also highlighted that institutions are important for other markets that are interrelated with 
comparative advantage, trade, and income, t he most notable being environmental 
institutions (see, for example, Copeland and Taylor 2004) and labour market institutions 
(Davis 1998).  
 
                                                 
23 The role of institutional reform in India and China is discussed more fully in Desroches, Francis, and 
Painchaud (2004), and, for China, in Francis, Painchaud, and Morin (2005).   30 
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Appendix A: Theoretical Foundations 
In this appendix we restate the key equilibrium relationships for the two economies under 
conditions of autarky and then free trade; we also prove Propositions 1 and 2. Letting j = 
N, S denote the North and South, respectively, recall the following equilibrium factor 
market equations: 
j j
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and similarly, for the capital-producing sector, we have,  
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The Ramsey rule for capital accumulation implies that 
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Equation (5) serves to determine the long-run equilibrium value of  ) (c k
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Thus, the quality of institutions serves to determine the equilibrium values of 
i s ,  ) (c k
j , 
) (z k
j , and, implicitly, the full set of relative autarkic goods prices.  
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This completes the description of the autarkic economy. I t remains to describe the 
equilibrium of the free  trading North-South model. Since  ) (c k
j , 
i s , and  ) (z k
j are 
independent of the trade equilibrium, their equilibrium values are described by equations 
(5), (6), and (6a). It remains therefore to determine the equilibrium values of 
j
T k and the 
equilibrium value of  z , which determines the range of goods produced by the North, 
z z £ £ 0 , and the South,  1 £ £ z z . Using the equilibrium values of 
i s ,  ) (c k
j , and 
) (z k
j , the values of 
j
T k  and  z  are jointly determined by the resource constraints for each 
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for the South. Equations (13) and (14) solve for 
N
T k  and 
S
T k . However, in this case the 
equilibrium value of each will depend on the value of  z , the equilibrium value of which 
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Proof of Proposition 1: 
To prove Proposition 1, use equations (5), (6), (7), and (9) and totally differentiate to give 
the following system: 
























where,   35 
c f m ¢ ¢ = 11 ,  0 12 = m ,  0 13 = m ,  0 14 = m  
c c f k m ¢ ¢ = 21 ,  1 22 = m ,  0 23 = m ,  0 24 = m  
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Note that  0 < M .  
Using Cramer’s rule, the following results can be derived: 
0
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and, by differentiating equation (6a), we get 
0
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This completes the proof of Proposition 1. QED. 
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Appendix B: Sources and Definitions of Variables 
Dependent Variable 
 





(A) Economic and Financial Variables 
 
All variables are obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and are 
computed as five-year averages for the periods 1972 to 1976, 1977 to 1981, 1982 to 
1986, 1987 to 1991, 1992 to 1996, and 1997 to 2001.  
  
2.  Per capita GDP in constant 1995 U.S. dollars. 
3.  Gross capital formation as a percentage of GDP. 
4.  General government final consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP. 
5.  Overall government budget balance, including grants as a percentage of GDP. 
6.  Domestic credit to private sector as a percentage of GDP. 
7.  Domestic credit provided by banking sector as a percentage of GDP. 
8.  Consumer price index, 1995=100. 
9.  Imports of goods and services from the world in constant 1995 U.S. dollars. 
10. Exports of goods and services to the world in constant 1995 U.S. dollars. 
11. GDP in constant 1995 U.S. dollars. 
12. Total trade as a percentage of GDP. Computed as ((no. 9 + no. 10)/ no. 11) from 
above. 
13. Education levels: average years of secondary schooling in the total population, from 
the Barro-Lee data set on educational attainment. 
 
(B) Institutional Quality 
 
From the PRS Group’s International Country Risk Guide. 
 
14. Law and order. 
15. Investment profile. 
 
From the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World: 2004 Annual Report. 
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Appendix C: List of Countries Used in Growth Regressions 
 
IFS Code  Country Name  IFS Code  Country Name 
111  United States  336  Guyana 
112  United Kingdom  343  Jamaica 
122  Austria  369  Trinidad & Tobago 
124  Belgium  419  Bahrain 
128  Denmark  423  Cyprus 
132  France  429  Iran 
134  Germany  436  Israel 
136  Italy  439  Jordan 
138  Netherlands  443  Kuwait 
142  Norway  463  Syrian 
144  Sweden  469  Egypt 
146  Switzerland  513  Bangladesh 
156  Canada  518  Myanmar 
158  Japan  524  Sri Lanka 
172  Finland  532  Hong Kong 
174  Greece  534  India 
176  Iceland  536  Indonesia 
178  Ireland  542  South Korea 
181  Malta  548  Malaysia 
182  Portugal  564  Pakistan 
184  Spain  566  Philippines 
186  Turkey  576  Singapore 
193  Australia  578  Thailand 
196  New Zealand  612  Algeria 
199  South  616  Botswana 
213  Argentina  622  Cameroon 
218  Bolivia  632  Comoros 
223  Brazil  636  Congo, Dem. 
228  Chile  652  Ghana 
238  Costa Rica  664  Kenya 
243  Dominican  676  Malawi 
248  Ecuador  678  Mali 
253  El Salvador  692  Niger 
258  Guatemala  698  Zimbabwe 
263  Haiti  722  Senegal 
268  Honduras  724  Sierra Leone 
273  Mexico  742  Togo 
278  Nicaragua  744  Tunisia 
283  Panama  746  Uganda 
288  Paraguay  754  Zambia 
293  Peru  853  Papua New Guinea 
298  Uruguay  924  China 
299  Venezuela  944  Hungary 
    964  Poland 
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Growth Regressions: The Interaction Between Institutions and Trade 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)* 
    1  2  3  4 
 
a. Institutions var. 














  GDP per capita  -1.95  -1.96  -2.17  -2.21 
    0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
  Population growth  -1.80  -1.87  -1.94  -2.00 
    0.034  0.03  0.02  0.02 
  Inflation  -1.01  -0.99  -1.01  -0.99 
    0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  Capital formation  21.34  21.36  21.98  22.04 
    0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  Government expenditure  -6.08  -6.06  -6.66  -6.70 
    0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00 
  Trade openness  -3.56  -1.60  -3.04  -2.04 
    0.04  0.35  0.07  0.25 
  Institutional quality (a)  1.52  2.05  1.43  1.88 
    0.03  0.00  0.01  0.00 
  Openness x Institutions interaction (b)  0.51  0.37  0.46  0.36 
    0.00  0.03  0.00  0.01 
  Constant  -23.18  -30.87  -24.61  -28.45 
    0.02  0.00  0.01  0.01 
 
 
Notes: LO = Law and order. IP = Investor protection. LSPR = Legal system and property rights. 


































Growth Regressions: The Interaction Between Institutions and Trade 
Three-Stage Least Square* 
    1  2  3  4 
 
a. Institutions var. 









  GDP per capita  -2.30  -6.13  -3.49  -4.95 
    0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  Population growth  -1.77  0.36  -1.95  -0.84 
    0.04  0.75  0.02  0.39 
  Inflation  -0.73  -0.20  -0.61  -0.17 
    0.01  0.63  0.02  0.65 
  Capital formation  6.50  -11.82  12.46  5.22 
    0.47  0.22  0.16  0.56 
  Government expenditure  -6.19  -5.88  -7.17  -6.83 
    0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  Trade openness  -2.35  -25.43  -2.42  -13.23 
    0.10  0.00  0.08  0.01 
  Institutional quality (a)  1.96  8.40  2.77  5.83 
    0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  Openness x Institutions interaction (b)  0.43  1.65  0.31  0.88 
    0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  Constant  17.65  127.37  6.43  43.43 
    0.44  0.00  0.77  0.10 
 
 
Notes: LO = Law and order. IP = Investor protection.  LSPR = Legal system and property rights. 





Growth Regressions: The Interaction Between Institutions and Trade 
Non-Linear IV Regression (NL IV) and Three-Stage Least Square (3SLS)* 
 
a. Institutions var. 





    NL IV  3SLS 
  GDP per capita  -3.04  -3.16 
    0.01  0.00 
  Population growth  -2.64  -1.52 
    0.03  0.10 
  Inflation  -0.75  -0.44 
    0.05  0.30 
  Capital formation  18.75  13.25 
    0.00  0.15 
  Government expenditure  -5.33  -5.37 
    0.11  0.00 
  Trade openness  -8.73  -26.48 
    0.04  0.09 
  Institutional quality (a)  2.04  3.51 
    0.00  0.04 
  Openness x Institutions interaction (b)  3.36  13.55 
    0.13  0.18 
  (Openness x Institutions interaction)
2  -0.48  -3.49 
    0.24  0.21 
  (Openness x Institutions Interaction)
3  0.02  0.29 
    0.288  0.22 
       
 
Notes: LO = Law and order. IP = Investor protection. LSPR = Legal system and property rights. 
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